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Summary
In debates about the welfare of animals, different people
have tended to emphasize different concerns. Some
emphasize the basic health and functioning of animals,
especially freedom from disease and injury. Others
emphasize the "affective states" of animals – states like
pain, distress and pleasure that are experienced as positive
or negative. Others emphasize the ability of animals to
live reasonably natural lives by carrying out natural
behaviour and having natural elements in their environ-
ment. These concerns constitute different criteria that peo-
ple use to assess animal welfare. The criteria overlap
substantially but are sufficiently independent that the sin-
gle-minded pursuit of any one criterion may lead to poor
welfare as judged by the others. The different criteria
reflect different sets of values that have been in conflict
since the early debates about human welfare during the
Industrial Revolution, with one side valuing a simple, nat-
ural life while the other values progress, productivity, and
a life improved by science and technology. Scientific
research on animal welfare has been based on the various
criteria of welfare. Such research has helped to identify
and solve animal welfare problems through improved
housing and management of animals. However, the
research has not resolved the differences attributable to
the different criteria of animal welfare. Rather, the differ-
ent criteria have provided the rationale for diverse
approaches to animal welfare research. Thus, our under-
standing of animal welfare is both values-based and sci-
ence-based. In this respect, animal welfare is like many
other topics of "mandated" science such as food safety
and environmental sustainability where the tools of sci-
ence are used within a framework of values.
A dilemma
To understand animal welfare and its scientific assess-
ment, let us begin with a dilemma that threatened to
throw animal welfare science into disarray.
In 1997 a scientific committee of the European Union
reviewed the literature on the welfare of intensively kept
pigs. The committee asked, among other questions,
whether welfare problems are caused by housing sows in
"gestation stalls" where the animals are unable to walk,
socialize, or perform most other natural behaviour during
the majority of pregnancy. The review concluded that,
"Some serious welfare problems for sows persist even in
the best stall-housing system" [1], and with this review in
hand the European Union passed a directive to ban the
gestation stall as of 2013.
Not long after, a group of Australian scientists reviewed
much the same literature and asked much the same ques-
tion, but came up with essentially the opposite conclu-
sion. They concluded that, "Both individual (i.e. stalls)
and group housing can meet the welfare requirements of
pigs." They also cautioned "public perceptions may result
in difficulties with the concept of confinement housing"
but that "the issue of public perception should not be con-
fused with welfare" [2]. The swine industry in the United
States has used that review, plus a similar one, to argue
from The role of the veterinarian in animal welfare. Animal welfare: too much or too little? The 21st Symposium of the Nordic Committee for Veterinary 
Scientific Cooperation (NKVet)
Værløse, Denmark. 24–25 September 2007
Published: 19 August 2008
Acta Veterinaria Scandinavica 2008, 50(Suppl 1):S1 doi:10.1186/1751-0147-50-S1-S1
<supplement> <title> <p>The role of the veterinarian in animal welfare. Animal welfare: too much or too little? The 21st Symposium of the Nordic Committee for Veterinary Scientific Cooperation (NKVet)</p> </title> <note>Meeting abstracts – A single PDF containing all abstracts in this Supplement is available <a href="http://www. biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1751-0147-50-S1-full.pdf">here</a>.</note> <url>http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/files/pdf/1751-0147-50-S1-info.pdf</url> </supplement>
This abstract is available from: http://www.actavetscand.com/content/50/S1/S1
© 2008 Fraser; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
Acta Veterinaria Scandinavica 2008, 50:S1 http://www.actavetscand.com/content/50/S1/S1
Page 2 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
that there is no scientific basis for eliminating the gesta-
tion stall.
Very accomplished and capable scientists did both of
these reviews with great thoroughness, and both groups
likely felt that they had done the best and most objective
job possible. What, then, went wrong? How could two
groups of scientists review the same scientific literature
and come up with opposite conclusions? If we can solve
this dilemma, the solution will take us a long way toward
understanding animal welfare and its scientific assess-
ment.
Different views of animal welfare
To solve this problem, we need to go back to the debate
that arose several decades ago when concerns were first
expressed about the welfare of animals in the then-new
confinement systems of animal production.
The first major criticism of confinement systems came in
the book Animal Machines, by the English animal advocate
Ruth Harrison [3]. She described cages for laying hens and
crates for veal calves, and she claimed that these systems
are so unnatural that they cause animals to lead miserable
and unhealthy lives. She went on to ask:
"How far have we the right to take our domination of the
animal world? Have we the right to rob them of all pleas-
ure in life simply to make more money more quickly out
of their carcasses? A decade later, in Animal Liberation, Aus-
tralian philosopher Peter Singer [4] based his criticism of
confinement production on the principle that actions
should be judged right or wrong on the basis of the pain
or pleasure that they cause. He claimed:
"There can be no moral justification for regarding the pain
(or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the
same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans."
In these and other quotations a key concern centred on
words like "pleasure", "pain", "suffering", and "happi-
ness". There is no simple English word to capture this class
of concepts. They are sometimes called "feelings", but that
term seems too insubstantial for states like pain and suf-
fering. They are sometimes called "emotions", but emo-
tions do not include states like hunger and thirst. Perhaps
the most accurate, if rather technical, term is "affective
states", a term that refers to emotions and other feelings
that are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant rather than
hedonically neutral.
In discussing confinement systems, however, some peo-
ple put the emphasis elsewhere. A British committee that
was formed to evaluate the welfare of farm animals con-
cluded:
"In principle we disapprove of a degree of confinement of
an animal which necessarily frustrates most of the major
activities which make up its natural behaviour." [5]
Astrid Lindgren, the famous author of the Pippi Long-
stocking stories and a driving force behind animal welfare
reform in Sweden, proposed:
"Let [farm animals] see the sun just once, get away from
the murderous roar of the fans. Let them get to breathe
fresh air for once, instead of manure gas." [6]
And American philosopher Bernard Rollin insisted that
we need:
"... a much increased concept of welfare. Not only will
welfare mean control of pain and suffering, it will also
entail nurturing and fulfilment of the animals' natures."
[7]
In these quotations, although affective states were often
involved implicitly or explicitly, the central concern was
for a degree of "naturalness" in the lives of animals: that
animals should be able to perform their natural behav-
iour, that there should be natural elements in their envi-
ronment, and that we should respect the "nature" of the
animals themselves. All of the above quotations reflected
the views of social critics and philosophers, but when
farmers and veterinarians engaged in the debate, they
brought a different focus. For example, one veterinarian
defended confinement systems this way:
"My experience has been that ... by-and-large the standard
of welfare among animals kept in the so called "intensive"
systems is higher. On balance I feel that the animal is bet-
ter cared for; it is certainly much freer from disease and
attack by its mates; it receives much better attention from
the attendants, is sure of shelter and bedding and a rea-
sonable amount of good food and water." [8]
Or as the veterinary educator David Sainsbury put it:
"Good health is the birthright of every animal that we
rear, whether intensively or otherwise. If it becomes dis-
eased we have failed in our duty to the animal and sub-
jected it to a degree of suffering that cannot be readily
estimated." [9]
Here the primary emphasis is on the fairly traditional con-
cerns of veterinarians and animal producers that animals
should have freedom from disease and injury, plus food,
water, shelter and other necessities of life – concerns that
we might sum up as the basic health and functioning of
the animals.
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In these various quotations, then, we see a variety of con-
cerns that can be grouped roughly under three broad
headings: one centres on the affective states of animals,
one on the ability of animals to lead reasonably natural
lives, and one emphasizes basic health and functioning.
These are not, of course, completely separate or mutually
exclusive; in fact, they often go hand in hand. Harrison
and Lindgren clearly believed that allowing animals to
live a more natural life would make them more happy and
healthy; Sainsbury clearly believed that unhealthy ani-
mals would suffer.
Nonetheless, the different areas of emphasis are suffi-
ciently independent that the pursuit of any one does not
necessarily improve animal welfare as judged by the other
criteria. Fifty years ago the American psychologist Harry
Harlow wanted to create a colony of disease-free monkeys
for research purposes. To do this Harlow separated infant
rhesus macaques from their mothers a few hours after
birth, and raised them in individual cages where they
could be isolated from pathogens. The monkeys could see
and hear each other but they had no physical contact. The
method produced monkeys with excellent physical
health, but as the animals matured Harlow realized that
they were, in his words, "emotionally disturbed":
"As a group they exhibit abnormalities of behavior rarely
seen in animals born in the wild and brought to the labo-
ratory as preadolescents or adolescents, even after the lat-
ter have been housed in individual cages for many years.
The laboratory-born monkeys sit in their cages and stare
fixedly into space, circle their cages in a repetitive stereo-
typed manner and clasp their heads in their hands or arms
and rock for long periods of time." [10]
In this example, the single-minded pursuit of physical
health led to animals that had very unnatural and seem-
ingly unhappy lives.
What if we pursue only naturalness? Various studies of
outdoor rearing systems show that animals may have
plenty of fresh air and freedom to perform their natural
behaviour, but may also be challenged by parasites, pred-
ators, and harsh weather that could be better controlled in
more artificial conditions. Examples of problems include
high neonatal mortality in outdoor pig units [11], and
high levels of parasitism among chickens on organic
farms [12].
Much the same is true of the pursuit of happiness. Well-
fed Labrador Retrievers may never suffer from hunger but
are likely to develop heart problems from being over-
weight [13], and human smokers may feel miserable
when they try to stop smoking even though they accept
that this painful process is good for their health.
Given this complexity, we are left with a conception of
animal welfare shown in Figure 1 which provides a sum-
mary of three key points: that animal welfare involves dif-
ferent components that can be grouped roughly under
three headings; that these involve considerable but imper-
fect overlap; and that the pursuit of any one criterion does
not guarantee a high level of welfare as judged by the oth-
ers.
A debate about values
The different views of animal welfare do not necessarily
involve disagreements about facts. An intensive animal
producer might conclude that welfare is good in a high-
health confinement system because the animals are
healthy and growing well; a critic might draw the opposite
conclusion because the animals are crowded together in
barren pens and develop abnormal behaviour. The two
parties may agree on factual issues such as the amount of
space per animal and the incidence of disease. Their disa-
greement is about values – specifically about what they
consider more important or less important for animals to
have good lives.
Why should people hold such different views about what
constitutes a good life for animals? To understand this dis-
agreement, it helps to review a debate that erupted over
the welfare of humans. During the Industrial Revolution,
the so-called "factory system" became the predominant
way of producing textiles and other goods throughout
much of Europe. Thousands of factories were erected, and
they proved so efficient that traditional, hand production
disappeared almost completely. Workers moved from vil-
lages and rural areas into cities; and instead of working at
hand looms in their homes, people operated machinery
in the factories. It was a profound social change, and it
touched off an intense debate over whether the new
industrial system was good or bad for the quality of
human life [14].
On one side of the debate were critics who insisted that
the factory system caused people to lead miserable and
unwholesome lives. Critics claimed that the cities created
cramped, unhealthy living conditions for the workers, and
deprived people of contact with nature. The machines
themselves caused many injuries, and (critics claimed)
they often led to physical deformities because they placed
an unnatural strain on the body. Perhaps worst of all, it
was claimed that repetitive work with machines made the
workers themselves like machines and led to an erosion of
their human nature and moral character.
But the factory system also had staunch defenders. Instead
of imposing unnatural strains, automation (the defenders
claimed) relieved workers of much of the drudgery that
manual handicrafts required. Far from being unnatural,
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the factory system represented a step in the natural pro-
gression from a time of human labour to a time when
automation would make labour unnecessary. Moreover,
the wise factory owner would take care to have healthy,
happy workers because maximum productivity would not
otherwise be achieved. In fact, the productivity of the sys-
tem was seen as proof that the factories were actually well
suited to human workers.
Because the effects of industrialization were so profound,
the debate engaged some of the leading intellectuals of the
day, and from their writing we can build up a picture of
the very different values and world views that lay behind
their arguments.
The world-view of the anti-industrial critics might roughly
be called Romantic/Agrarian, and it reflects a set of values
that we see extending from the rural poetry of the Latin
author Virgil, through to the Pastoralist and Romantic
poets and painters of the 1600s to 1800s. This world-view
values a simple, natural life. It sees nature as an ideal state
that we should strive to emulate. It values emotional expe-
rience and the freedom of the individual. And it looks
back to a Golden Age in the past when people lived in har-
mony with nature.
The world-view of the pro-industrialists was more a prod-
uct of the Enlightenment when people looked to reason
and science to replace superstition and ignorance. This
world-view involved two concepts that were relatively
new to Western thought.
One of these was productivity. Adam Smith opened his
book The Wealth of Nations by claiming that the quality of
life in a nation depends on the goods that are available to
supply the citizens with what they need and want. Increas-
ing the productivity of the work force, and thus increasing
the supply of goods, should therefore improve the lives of
Three conceptions of animal welfare, adapted from Michael Appleby [21] and Vonne Lund [21]Figure 1
Three conceptions of animal welfare, adapted from Michael Appleby [21] and Vonne Lund [21].
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a nation's people. Hence the factory system, whereby
automation and specialization lead to greater productiv-
ity, would ultimately make life better [15].
The second idea was progress – the idea that human his-
tory moves irreversibly in the direction of improvement.
As historian Sydney Pollard points out, belief in progress
began with science, because in science each generation
was seen as building on the work of earlier generations so
that knowledge constantly improves. But during the
1700s the idea of progress took wing, and by 1800, in the
words of Pollard, "firm convictions had been expressed
about the inevitability of progress in wealth, in civiliza-
tion, in social organization, in art and literature, even in
human nature and biological make-up." [16].
And a belief that change represents progress, and that we
cannot "stand in the way of progress", has remained a
common theme in Western thought ever since.
Thus, the Rational/Industrial world-view was very differ-
ent from the Romantic/Agrarian world-view. Instead of
valuing a simple, natural life, it valued a life improved
through science and technology. It viewed nature not as
an ideal state that we should emulate, but as an imperfect
state that we should control and improve. It valued ration-
ality rather than irrational emotion, and the productivity
of the well organized enterprise more than the freedom of
the individual. And instead of looking back to a Golden
Age of harmony with nature, it looked forward to a
Golden Age in the future when progress through science
and technology would lead to a better life.
The debate over human welfare during the Industrial Rev-
olution has obvious parallels with the debate over animal
welfare during the intensification of animal agriculture. In
fact, much of the disagreement over animal welfare can be
traced to the continued influence of the contrasting
world-views.
People who lean more toward a Romantic/Agrarian
world-view will see a good life for animals as (primarily)
a natural life, to be achieved by emulating nature through
such means as free-range systems and access to the out-
doors. They will emphasize the emotions of animals (are
they suffering? are they happy?), and attach importance to
their freedom. For these various reasons, people who
favour a Romantic/Agrarian world-view are likely to see
confinement systems as inherently incompatible with a
high level of welfare, and they may look back to tradi-
tional, non-confinement systems as an ideal that we
should try to return to.
In contrast, those who lean more toward a Rational/
Industrial world-view will tend to see a good life for ani-
mals as (primarily) a healthy life, to be achieved by pre-
venting disease and avoiding other vicissitudes of nature.
They will value the rationality and scientific basis of the
system more than the freedom of the individual animals,
and they will see a high level of productivity as evidence
that the animals are doing well. Thus, such people are
likely to see confinement systems as a form of progress
that improves both animal and human welfare, and they
may look upon older, non-confinement systems as out-
moded models that need to be improved upon.
Animal welfare and science
When these value-based disagreements began to emerge
in the debate about confinement production systems,
many people thought that science would provide the way
to decide among the different views of animal welfare and
tell us which is right and which is wrong. However, scien-
tists themselves are influenced by the different world-
views that are present in our culture. In fact, when we
examine the wide range of scientific methods used to
study animal welfare, we can see that the different criteria
of animal welfare provided the rationale for some of the
different scientific approaches.
Some scientists have used the basic health and function-
ing of animals as a basis for assessing and improving ani-
mal welfare. As one classic example Ragnar Tauson and
co-workers improved the welfare of laying hens by study-
ing the basic health of birds in cages of different types and
then developing cage designs that would prevent the vari-
ous health problems they observed [17]. The scientists
found that the birds developed foot lesions if the floor
was too steeply sloped, and neck lesions if the feed trough
was too deep and installed too high for comfortable
access. There was often feather damage that could be
reduced by using solid side partitions, and overgrown
claws that could be prevented by installing abrasive strips.
Thus, just by focusing on injuries it was possible to make
large improvements in animal welfare, and these results
formed the basis of regulations on cage design in Sweden
and later in the European Union.
Other scientists have tried to improve animal welfare by
focusing on natural behaviour and natural living condi-
tions for animals. For example, as a basis for designing
better housing for pigs Alex Stolba and David Wood-Gush
began by observing pigs that they had released in a hilly,
wooded area [18]. They found that the pigs showed cer-
tain characteristic types of behaviour: they rooted in the
soil, exercised their neck muscles by levering against fallen
logs, built nests in secluded areas before giving birth, and
used dunging areas well removed from their resting areas.
Stolba and Wood-Gush then designed a complex com-
mercial pen that allowed the animals to behave in these
ways. It included an area with peat moss for rooting, logs
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for levering, and an activity area with a rubbing post, a
separate dunging area, and secluded areas at the back
where a sow could be enclosed to farrow. The authors
claimed that the complex pen significantly improved the
animals' welfare.
However, because some aspects of basic health (especially
neonatal survival) were not as good in this system as in
well-run confinement systems, some people disagreed
with that conclusion.
In less radical approaches, scientists have incorporated
simple elements of natural behaviour into existing rearing
systems. On many commercial dairy farms, calves are sep-
arated from their mothers within the first day after birth,
and are fed milk from a bucket, usually twice per day.
With such infrequent meals the total intake has to be lim-
ited so that the calf does not receive too much milk at one
time. Under natural conditions, cows stay fairly close to
the calves for the first two weeks, and the calf will feed
many times per day in smaller meals. Although it is nor-
mally not feasible to leave calves with the cow on a diary
farm, feeding systems can still be made to correspond
more closely to the animals' natural behaviour. If the
calves are fed more frequently (as they are by the cow),
then they can drink more milk per day without develop-
ing digestive problems; and if the calves suck from an arti-
ficial teat rather than drinking from a pail, the action of
sucking leads to a greater release of certain digestive hor-
mones. As might be expected, therefore, calves fed fre-
quently by teat gain substantially more weight than calves
fed twice daily by bucket [19].
In other cases, scientists have based animal welfare
research on the affective states of animals. Dairy calves are
commonly dehorned by a variety of methods including
surgical removal of the horn bud or the use of a hot iron
to burn through the nerves and blood vessels that allow
the horn to develop. In many countries these procedures
are done without any form of pain management. A
research group in New Zealand used plasma cortisol levels
as an indicator of the pain caused by dehorning. They
found that dehorning is followed immediately by a large
increase in cortisol, but that the reaction is blocked if a
local anaesthetic is used to freeze the area. In the treated
calves, however, cortisol levels showed a marked increase
several hours after the dehorning, probably because the
injury remained inflamed and painful when the anaes-
thetic had worn off. If the calves also received an analge-
sic, the second peak in cortisol could also be eliminated.
Thus the research showed that management of the pain of
dehorning requires both a local anaesthetic and an anal-
gesic [20].
All of the approaches described above have been useful
for identifying and solving animal welfare problems.
However, instead of the science providing a way to deter-
mine that one conception of animal welfare is correct and
others are not, we see that the different scientists actually
adopted the different value-based views of animal welfare
– basic health and functioning, natural living, and affec-
tive states – as the rationale for different scientific
approaches to assessing and improving animal welfare.
In summary, animal welfare is clearly a concept that can
be studied scientifically, but our understanding of animal
welfare, and even the science that we do to assess and
improve animal welfare, is influenced by value-based
ideas about what is important or desirable for animals to
have a good life. Thus, we have a concept that is both sci-
ence-based and values-based.
This situation may come as a surprise to scientists who
have been taught to think of science as "value-free". Dur-
ing the 1800s, there was active debate about the bounda-
ries of science and how science relates to matters of ethics
and policy. Scientists like Max Weber rightly pointed out
that science has a fact-finding role that helps to inform
policy, but that research itself does not answer ethical or
policy questions [21]. Such thinking obviously has merit,
but in its crudest form it gave rise to the idea that values
play no role in science. However, if a concept like animal
welfare can be both science-based and values-based, then
clearly we need a more nuanced understanding of the
place of values in science.
The term "mandated science" refers to science that has
been commissioned or undertaken in order to guide
actions, decisions and policy. In this sense mandated sci-
ence differs from science done simply to understand the
natural world. Mandated science includes research on top-
ics such as health, food safety, agricultural sustainability
and animal welfare. In all these cases, the science is done
to address concepts (health, safety, sustainability, welfare)
that incorporate notions of merit or worth. To say that
health or safety or sustainability or welfare has increased
implies not merely a change but a change for the better.
Hence, these concepts, while fully amenable to scientific
research, are also rooted in value-based ideas about what
people believe to be more or less desirable.
In the case of animal welfare, then, decisions can be based
on a sound, scientific understanding of animals and how
they are affected by housing, management procedures,
and health care measures. However, the data that we
choose to collect and consider when making decisions
about animal welfare are determined by value-based ideas
about what elements are important for animals to have a
good life.
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Conclusion
Let us return to the dilemma that was created when two
scientific reviews arrived at opposite conclusions about
the welfare of sows in gestation stalls. If we look carefully
at the reviews, we see that they were based on different
conceptions of animal welfare.
The Australian reviewers based their analysis almost exclu-
sively on the basic health and functioning of the animals,
and they relied especially on what they called "widely
accepted criteria of poor welfare such as health, immunol-
ogy, injuries, growth rate, and nitrogen balance". They did
not deny that affective states are involved in animal wel-
fare, but they took the view that all significant risks to wel-
fare would have effects on health and functioning
variables. Thus, by presenting evidence that sows in stalls
are generally no worse than sows in other types of housing
in survival, weight gain, litter size, disease incidence and
such variables, they concluded that, "Both individual and
group housing can meet the welfare requirements of
pigs".
The European reviewers used a conception of welfare that
included affective states and natural living as well as basic
health and functioning. Thus they included evidence of
fear and frustration in their analysis of animal welfare,
whether or not the basic health of the animals was
affected. They also considered that the opportunity for
"exploration of a complex environment, rooting in a soft
substratum and manipulation of materials such as straw"
is relevant to animal welfare because of its link to natural
behaviour. Using such criteria they conclude: "Some seri-
ous welfare problems for sows persist even in the best
stall-housing system".
In this example, what appeared to be a scientific disagree-
ment – the sort of disagreement that might be resolved by
better experiments – was actually due to a difference in
values, specifically about what is important for animals to
have good welfare.
Given that there are different conceptions of animal wel-
fare that are not resolved by scientific research, and that
these are based on values and world-views that have deep
roots in our culture, how should we proceed in creating
practical programs and policies to ensure high standards
of animal welfare? I think the simplest message is that
actions designed to improve animal welfare are not likely
to achieve widespread support unless they take account of
the different conceptions of animal welfare to at least
some degree. Animal producers are not likely to convince
their critics that high-health confinement systems are
good for animal welfare if these systems cause frustration
and prevent animals from carrying out most of their nat-
ural behaviour. Free-range producers are not likely to con-
vince their critics that seemingly natural systems are good
for animal welfare if the animals suffer from harsh
weather, parasites and have poor neonatal survival. For
actions to be widely accepted as achieving high animal
welfare, in addition to being based on good animal wel-
fare science, they will need to make a reasonable fit to the
major value positions about what constitutes a good life
for animals.
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